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I. INTRODUCTION
In Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch' the
United States Supreme Court held, for the first time, that a state tax
statute violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal
Constitution.2 The future impact of this decision has been the subject
of much recent speculation.3 In particular, commentators have de-
bated Kurth's effect on the civil consequences labeled "additions to
tax' found in the Internal Revenue Code which are assessed and col-
lected in connection with criminal taxpayer fraud.4 These additions
were examined in Helvering v. Mitchell5 over fifty years ago, and up-
held against a double jeopardy challenge.6 However, the continuing
validity of Mitchell is questionable in light of the Court's decision in
Kurth. The Kurth majority expressly cited Mitchell as justification for
subjecting a tax statute to double jeopardy analysis.1 Moreover, the
reasoning and language in Kurth itself, when applied to the current
equivalent of the addition to tax upheld in Mitchell, arguably invali-
dates the provision.
In order to demonstrate the potentially broad scope of the
Kurth decision, this Recent Development will show how the Kurth
reasoning could invalidate additions to tax for fraud under a double
jeopardy challenge. This Recent Development will first briefly discuss
1. 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 767 (1994) ("Kurth"). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion
of the court and was joined by Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg. Dissenting
opinions were filed by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Scalia, who was joined by Justice
Thomas.
2. Id. at 1947-48. The Double Jeopardy Clause states in pertinent part: "... nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.. ." U.S.
Const., Amend. V.
3. See generally John J. Tigue, Jr. and Linda A. Lacewell, Taxes are for Revenue, Not
Punishment, 211 N.Y. L. J. 1 (1994); Leonard Reed Rosenblatt, Has the Tax Man Finally
Grabbed Too Much?, 17 Legal Times 23 (1994); Elkan Abramowitz, Double Jeopardy and Civil
Sanctions, 212 N.Y. L. J. 3 (1994).
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663 (1989); I.R.C. § 6663 (CCH 1994).
5. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
6. Id. at 398-405.
7. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n.16.
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the facts and procedural history of Kurth. Part III will examine the
history of the Double Jeopardy Clause, especially in the area of
parallel civil and criminal proceedings, and will briefly survey the
Supreme Court's past treatment of constitutional challenges to tax
statutes. Part IV will then detail each decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in its disposition of Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch. Part V will focus on additions to tax for
fraud and Kurth's effect on the constitutionality of such additions
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
II. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF MONTANA V. KURTH RANCH: FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October of 1987, Montana law enforcement officers raided a
farm operated by six members of the extended Kurth family,8 arrested
the Kurths, and confiscated marijuana plants, materials, and para-
phernalia which were being used in the family's marijuana business. 9
Not only did this raid terminate the Kurths' marijuana business, it
also instigated a series of four legal proceedings involving the Kurth
family. 0  In the third proceeding, the Montana Department of
Revenue sought to collect $900,000 in taxes under the 1987 version of
the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act,1" which provided for a
8. Id. at 1939. The family members involved were Richard and Judith Kurth, their
children, Douglas Kurth and Cindy Halley, and their spouses, Rhonda Kurth and Clayton
Halley, respectively. Id. at 1942 n.6.
9. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 Bankr. 61, 66 (Bkrtcy. D. Mont. 1990).
10. First, criminal charges were filed against all members of the family for conspiracy to
possess drugs with the intent to sell under Montana Code Annotated § 45-4-102 or, in the alter-
native, possession of drugs with the intent to sell under Montana Code Annotated § 45-4-102.
Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1942. Each family member eventually entered into a plea agreement, and
Richard and Judith were sentenced to prison, while the others received suspended or deferred
sentences. Second, a civil forfeiture action was instituted seeking recovery of cash and
equipment used in the marijuana operation. The action was settled with an agreement to forfeit
$18,016.83 in cash and equipment. Third, the Department of Revenue ('DOR') applied the 1987
version of the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-101 through 15-25-
123 (1987), for the first time, and attempted to collect over $900,000 in taxes. Although the
Kurths contested this assessment in administrative proceedings, this action was stayed upon
the initiation of the fourth proceeding. Fourth, a petition for bankruptcy was filed by the
Kurths under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). It was in this proceeding
that the Kurths challenged the constitutionality of the Dangerous Drug Tax. Kurth, 114 S. Ct.
at 1942-43.
11. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-101 through 15-25-123. Since the Supreme Court's decision
in Kurth, the Montana legislature has repealed §§ 15-25-101, 15-25-102, 15-25-111, 15-25-112,
15-25-113, 15-25-114, 15-25-115, 15-25-121, 15-25-122, 15-25-123. Legislative Review: A
Summary of Enactments in the 54th Montana Legislature 181-82 (Mont. Legis. Council, 1995).
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possession and storage tax on dangerous drugs.12 The drug tax was to
be collected only after any state or federal fines or forfeitures have
been satisfied,13 and is the greater of ten percent of the market value
of the drugs or a specified amount, according to the character of the
drug possessed.14 Under regulations adopted by the Department of
Revenue to administer the Dangerous Drug Tax Act, a taxpayer must
file a tax return within seventy-two hours of arrest for illegal drug
activitys in order to determine the tax liability due.
The constitutional questions raised by application of the
Dangerous Drug Tax Act to the Kurths were first addressed in the
bankruptcy proceedings initiated by the Kurths as a result of their
arrest. 6 The bankruptcy court concluded that because the assess-
ments on the live marijuana plants and oil were "arbitrary" and made
without any factual basis, they were invalid as a matter of state law.17
The court further held that although an assessment of $181,000 on
1,811 ounces of harvested marijuana was authorized by the Act,18 the
assessment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal
Constitution. 9 The bankruptcy court rejected the state's argument
that the tax was remedial and designed to reimburse the government
for its law enforcement costs.20 Instead, the court noted various as-
pects of the Act 2' which led it to the conclusion that the goal of the
drug tax was to deter and punish, and therefore its primary purpose
was punitive.22
The District Court affirmed,23 and concluded that the Montana
Dangerous Drug Tax Act violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by
12. Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111.
13. Id. at § 15-25-111(3).
14. Id. at § 15-25-111(2).
15. Mont. Admin. Rule 42.34.102(1) (1988). In addition, regulations required a law
enforcement official to prepare a dangerous drug information report at the time of arrest, to
allow the taxpayer the option to sign it, and if that option was not exercised, to file the form
within 72 hours of arrest. Id. at Rule 42.34.102(3).
16. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1943.
17. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 Bankr. at 69.
18. The Act authorized a tax on marijuana at the rate of $100 per ounce. Mont. Code Ann.
§ 15-25-111(2).
19. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 Bankr. at 69.
20. Id. at 74. The bankruptcy court relied primarily on United States v. Halper, which
held that a civil penalty would constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause if it bore no rational relationship to the goal of compensating the governifient for its
damages and costs. 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989).
21. The bankruptcy court noted, for example, that the Drug Act resulted in a tax eight
times the product's market value, that drug taxes have historically been viewed as penal in
nature, and that the tax applies to acts already treated as a crime and is imposed only on crimi-
nals. In re Kurth Ranch, 145 Bankr. at 75-76.
22. Id. at 76.
23. In re Kurth Ranch, No. CV-90-084-GF, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21133 (D. Mont. 1991).
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punishing the Kurths a second time for the same criminal conduct.24
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also affirmed, it
did not hold the Act unconstitutional on its face.2. Instead the court
held that the Kurths were entitled to an accounting to determine
whether the sanction imposed was rationally related to the damages
that the government suffered.26 In the absence of any such accounting
by the government in this case, the court concluded that the tax was
unconstitutional as applied to the Kurths.27
While In re Kurth Ranch was pending on appeal, the Montana
Supreme Court held that the Dangerous Drug Tax Act did not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause,28 because the legislature intended to
establish a civil, not a criminal, penalty,29 and because the tax had a
remedial purpose apart from its goals of retribution and deterrence. 30
Since the holding and reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court was
at odds with that of the federal courts in the Kurth proceedings, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.31 The Court, in a
five-four decision, 32 held that the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution by
imposing a second punishment in a proceeding that was the func-
tional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution. 33
24. Id. at *13. Like the bankruptcy court, the district court relied on Halper and invali-
dated the punitive civil consequences because they sought only the goals of retribution and
deterrence. Id. See note 20 (discussing the Halper case).
25. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1993).
26. Id. at 1311-12. The Halper Court required this accounting in order to determine
whether a consequence was reimbursement or punishment. 490 U.S. at 449-50.
27. Id. at 1312.
28. Sorensen v. State Dept. of Revenue, 254 Mont. 61, 836 P.2d 29, 31 (1992).
29. This reasoning is consistent with the statutory construction test articulated in
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938), and discussed in detail in Part IIIL. The
Montana Supreme Court refused to apply Halper, stating that its holding was self-limiting, as
being only for the "rare case," and that it was distinguishable as Halper dealt with penalties and
not taxes. Sorensen, 836 P.2d at 32-33.
30. Id. at 31-33.
31. 114S. Ct. 38, 125 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1993).
32. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Blackmun,
Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg joined. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Rehnquist,
O'Conner, and Scalia. Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Justice Thomas.
33. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1948.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The concept of double jeopardy has been a part of jurispruden-
tial systems since Greek and Roman times.3 4 A literal reading of the
Double Jeopardy Clause35 and a study of the English common law
origins of the protection indicates that the provision was originally
thought to apply only to criminal consequences 36 and to prohibit only
penalties involving "iffe or limb" in a second prosecution for the same
offense.3 7 However, this interpretation was rejected by the Supreme
Court,3 8 and today the concept is a constitutional protection on both
the federal and state39 levels, applicable to civil4° as well as criminal 41
cases.
The Double Jeopardy Clause contains two distinct protections.
First, the clause prohibits multiple punishments.42 Second, the clause
prohibits multiple prosecutions. 43 The Supreme Court recognized
34. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L. J. 262, 262 n.1 (1965). See also Donald Eric
Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49 Ohio St.
L. J. 799, 800 (1988) (stating that "[some kind of double jeopardy maxim has existed 'in almost
all systems of jurisprudence throughout history.'"). See generally Jay A. Sigler, Double
Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social Policy 2-37 (Cornell, 1969) (tracing the
concept's development from ancient to modern times).
35. The Federal Constitution states: "... . nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." U.S. Const., Amend. V.
36. Andrew Z. Glickman, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the
Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings after United States v. Halper, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 1251, 1251 n.2 (1990); Elizabeth S. Jahncke, United States v. Halper, Punitive Civil Fines,
and the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines Clauses, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 112, 113 & n.15 (1991).
37. See Sigler, Double Jeopardy at 5 (cited in note 34) (stating that the phrase referred to
penalties of death or physical mutilation). See also Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1254 (cited in
note 36); Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 113 (cited in note 36).
38. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) 163, 172-73 (1873) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause covers misdemeanors and felonies of any type).
39. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Federal Constitution to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
40. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 (holding that a civil penalty constituted punishment for pur-
poses of the Double Jeopardy Clause's multiple punishment protection as it bore no rational
relationship to the goal of compensating the government for its losses or costs). Cases prior to
Halper held, specifically, that the clause applied only to criminal proceedings. See, for example,
Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398-99.
41. Lange, 85 U.S. at 172-73.
42. Id. at 173 (stating that "the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the
criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it').
Although the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not include the prohibition against
multiple punishments, several commentators have stated that the concept was contemplated by
the framers and was possibly included in early drafts of the provision. See, for example, charles
L. Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 24 S. Tex. L. J. 735, 769 (1983); Comment, 75 Yale L. J. at 265-66, nn. 12-13 (cited in
note 34); Sigler, Double Jeopardy at 28, 32 (cited in note 34); George C. Thomas, III, A Unified
Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 3 n.3 (1985).
43. See Lange, 85 U.S. at 172-73; North Carolina v. Pearce, 385 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
1426
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these two protections as the foundation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause in North Carolina v. Pearce,44 stating that a defendant may
not be subjected to a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal or conviction, nor subjected to multiple punishments for the
same offense. 46
A multiple prosecution violation occurs when a defendant's
conduct violates two or more criminal statutes. If the defendant is
prosecuted under one statute and is either convicted or acquitted, a
later prosecution for the same underlying conduct under any other
statute which proscribes such conduct constitutes a multiple
prosecution violation.46 However, unless the statutes in question
proscribe the "same offense" as mandated by the Double Jeopardy
Clause, a multiple prosecution violation has not occurred. Moreover,
if proof of an additional fact is required under one of the subsequent
statutes, then the exact same offense is not being prosecuted, and no
constitutional violation has occurred. 47 By preventing the defendant
from being tried several times for the same illegal acts, 48 the
protection against multiple prosecutions preserves the finality of the
first judgment for the benefit of both the defendant and the judicial
system as a whole.49
There are several situations in which a multiple punishment
violation occurs. First, a defendant's conduct may be punishable un-
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
45. Id. at 717. Although the prohibition of multiple punishments is now constitutionally
recognized, there are several common situations when the multiple punishments protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is erroneously invoked, such as when multiple punishments are
imposed by separate sovereigns, when the multiple punishments are imposed in the same
judicial proceeding, and when the two punishments are of a civil and criminal nature and the
civil penalty retains its remedial nature. Lauren Orchard Clapp, Note, United States v. Halper:
Remedial Justice and Double Jeopardy, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 979, 984 n.49 (1990).
46. Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 115 (cited in note 36).
47. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). There is scholarly debate
concerning the exact value of Blockburger to the issue of multiple prosecution violations.
Compare Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 119-20 (cited in note 36) (stating that while
Blockburger's application to multiple punishment cases has been diminished, it has survived
and been enhanced as applied to multiple prosecution cases), with Eli J. Richardson, Recent
Development, Matching Tests for Double Jeopardy Violations with Constitutional Interests, 45
Vand. L. Rev. 273, 279 (1991) (stating that Blockburger does not provide the exclusive test for
determining whether successive prosecutions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
48. The multiple prosecution protection operates as a type of collateral estoppel, ensuring
that a prior judgment between the same parties in a different cause of action binds those parties
or their privies as to those matters or issues previously decided. Black's Law Dictionary 261
(West, 6th ed. 1990). In addition, the multiple prosecution protection can be seen as a type of
resjudicata, ensuring that a matter once judicially decided is final. Id. at 1305-06.
49. Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 116 (cited in note 36); Richardson, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at
277 (cited in note 47).
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der more than one statute.0 Second, a defendant's conduct may be
fragmented so that each unit of the conduct constitutes a separate
violation of the statute.51 In both situations the concern is that the
sentences will exceed those statutorily authorized by the legislature. 52
Third, a defendant's misconduct may give rise to both civil and crimi-
nal consequences. 53 In such a situation, if the civil consequence is
punitive, rather than remedial, it operates as punishment for double
jeopardy purposes and may not be imposed following a criminal con-
sequence. 54
Although there are clear theoretical distinctions between mul-
tiple punishment and multiple prosecution protections under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court did not adhere to such
distinctions5 when finally applying the clause's protections to civil
proceedings in its landmark decision in United States v. Halper.6
Consequently, the scholarly debate in this area is of questionable
significance. 57
50. These cases have traditionally been labeled double description violations. See Clapp,
68 N.C. L. Rev. at 984 n.47 (cited in note 45) (citing examples of double description cases);
Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1255, 1255 n.22 (cited in note 36) (same); Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 115-116 (cited in note 36) (giving a hypothetical example of a double description case).
51. These cases have traditionally been called unit-of-prosecution cases. See Clapp, 68
N.C. L. Rev. at 984 n.48 (cited in note 45) (citing examples of unit-of-prosecution cases);
Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 116 n.34 (cited in note 36) (same).
52. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall) at 168.
Justice Scalia would recognize only these two types of multiple punishment violations. Kurth,
114 S. Ct. at 1955-57. Moreover, he would categorize them as violations of the Due Process
Clause rather than as the so-called multiple punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id. Justice Scalia reasons that exceeding the amount of punishment authorized by the
legislature violates the Due Process Clause's guarantee of legislative authorization for
punishment, erroneously called the multiple punishment protection. Id. See text accompanying
notes 176-82.
53. When civil and criminal consequences are invoked in separate proceedings, a parallel
proceeding is said to have occurred. See Part III.A.
54. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that a defendant who has already been punished
in a criminal proceeding may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that
the second sanction may be characterized as a deterrent or as retribution, rather than as
remedial).
55. Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1262 & nn. 68 & 69 (cited in note 36) (noting the
significance of the Supreme Court's characterization of Halper as a multiple punishment case
and reviewing the confusion in the briefs to the Court concerning the case's status as a multiple
prosecution case). See Paul F. Kirgis, Note, The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive
Awards, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in
Halper was a great divergence from precedent as it prohibited multiple punishments in
successive prosecutions).
56. 490 U.S. at 448-49 (holding that the civil penalty under consideration constituted
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause's multiple punishment protection).
57. See generally Richardson, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 273 (cited in note 47) (discussing the two
distinct protections, their unique operations, and the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of
them); Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 114 (cited in note 36) (noting the clause's tangled history of
judicial interpretation); Kirgis, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 865 n.161, 867 (cited in note 55)
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Although the Double Jeopardy Clause was originally thought
to apply only to the most serious of criminal consequences, today the
Clause's protections apply to all civil tax consequences imposed in
parallel proceedings. In theory, this application encompasses non-
remedial tax statutes. Until Kurth, however, a tax statute had never
been invalidated under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In fact,
challenges to tax statutes under other constitutional provisions were,
in large part, equally unsuccessful.
A. Double Jeopardy in Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings
When a regulation or statute authorizes concurrent civil sanc-
tions and criminal penalties for an illegal activity,58 and both civil and
criminal actions are instituted based upon the same facts,59 a parallel
proceeding has occurred.60 There is no constitutional violation in such
a situation if both the criminal and civil consequences are imposed in
the same proceeding,61 or if the civil consequence operates only as a
remedy to compensate the government for its losses and costs. 62
However, if the civil consequence simply serves the goals of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence63-and follows criminal conse-
(discussing the confusion surrounding the two protections in the context of Halper); Peter
Westen and Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 S. Ct. Rev. 81,
82-84 (discussing the confusion surrounding Supreme Court precedents concerning the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
58. For an extensive list of such statutes and regulations, see Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at
1278 n.145 (cited in note 36).
59. Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1023, 1023 n.5 (1985). See Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 122 (cited in note 36)
(giving a hypothetical example of a parallel proceeding-double jeopardy situation).
60. See Note, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1023 (cited in note 59) (outlining the different
protections afforded by the criminal and the civil processes which conflict when parallel civil
and criminal proceedings are instituted). See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on
Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending
the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings L. J. 1325 (1991) (discussing the history and
effects of blending criminal and civil consequences in the context of several constitutional
protections).
61. United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1534 (11th Cir. 1988).
62. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the
Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 Va. L.
Rev. 1025, 1046 (1993).
63. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. But see Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1265 n.87 (cited in
note 36) (stating that the precedent relied upon in Halper to support the statement that
retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives does not
actually support that conclusion).
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quences, a multiple punishment violation has occurred triggering the
protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.64
Judicial application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil
sanctions in parallel proceedings has evolved from a statutory con-
struction test65 heavily favoring the government and its labeling of a
consequence as civil,66 to a judicial inquiry into the actual goals and
effects of the consequence in question. 67
1. Development of the Statutory Construction Test
The Court first articulated the statutory construction test in
Helvering v. Mitchell.6s In Mitchell, the defendant was acquitted at
his criminal trial for willful evasion of taxes.69 However, Mitchell was
subsequently subjected to a civil action to collect the tax deficiency
due to his alleged misconduct plus a fifty percent addition to the tax.70
Mitchell's double jeopardy claim asserted that the fifty percent
addition to tax was intended as punishment, thus making the second
procedure inherently criminal. Consequently, he argued that the
government was barred from collecting the addition to tax by the
Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of successive prosecutions.71
The Court characterized this question as one of statutory con-
struction -7 2 and held that the sanction imposed a civil, rather than
criminal, consequence for several reasons. First, the revenue statute
established a civil proceeding for the collection of the sanction.73
Second, the additions to tax were found under the heading "Interest
and Additions to the Tax," rather than under the heading "Penalties,"
64. For a discussion of the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, including
the operation of the multiple punishments prong, see notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
65. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399.
66. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (adding to the statutory construction test
the promise that only the clearest proof would suffice to establish a punitive purpose or effect).
See Dudley, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1044 (cited in note 62) (stating that "it is fair to say that the Court
most often sided with the government, and it always gave great deference to legislative
judgment in designating a particular penalty or proceeding civil or criminal").
67. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
68. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
69. Id. at 396.
70. Id. at 395. This addition to tax is the same civil consequence discussed in Part V of
this Recent Development. It is noteworthy that since Mitchell was acquitted in his prior
criminal trial, and therefore received no actual punishment, he was forced to construct an
argument under the multiple prosecution prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 398-99,
405-06.
71. Id. at 398.
72. Id. at 399.
73. Id. at 401-402.
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which imposed criminal consequences. 74 Third, safeguarding the
protection of the revenue75 and reimbursing the government for costs
incident to taxpayer misconduct were legitimate remedial and civil
purposes for such additions to tax.76  Finally, the Court pointed out
that such consequences had historically been recognized as civil. 77
Under the statutory construction test created in Mitchell, a
court determined the remedial or punitive character of a consequence
by conducting a simple inquiry into what the legislature intended the
penalty to be. Such an inquiry essentially translated into a considera-
tion of the label, language, and procedures that the legislature at-
tached to the consequence. 78 Because the Court adhered to the legis-
lature's characterization of a consequence as civil or criminal, it often
denied double jeopardy claims without inquiry into the actual opera-
tion or effect of a particular consequence. 79
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,80 the Supreme Court created
an objective test to determine whether a proceeding was civil or
criminal, which included inquiries into the consequence's character
and effect. 81 However, this objective test rarely resulted in a finding
that a penalty was criminal.82 Nearly twenty years later in United
74. Id. at 404-405.
75. It is arguable that safeguarding the revenue is a deterrent rather than a remedial
purpose, which would clothe these additions to tax in a criminal, rather than a civil light and
render them invalid after Halper. Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1257 n.35 (cited in note 36).
76. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401. As some commentators point out, the idea of compensating
the government is construed loosely since it is not necessary for the government to prove the
exact amount of damages, or even in some cases, actual damages at all. See Clapp, 68 N.C. L.
Rev. at 986 n.60 (cited in note 45); Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1266 (cited in note 36). See also
Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1956) (stating that the failure of the
government to allege any quantifiable monetary damages was "not fatal" to recovery of a fine).
77. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400.
78. See Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1256-61 (cited in note 36) (detailing the application
and development of the statutory construction test in the years following Mitchell).
79. See, for example, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1943)
(finding that because the legislature intended civil penalties for double damages plus $2,000
under the False Claims Act following the imposition of criminal consequences to be remedial,
and not criminal, plaintiffs multiple punishment claim failed); Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at 153-
54 (stating that the sanction, clearly intended to be civil by the legislature, did not become penal
even though it might exceed the government's actual damages).
80. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
81. Id. at 168-69. This objective test was composed of seven factors: (1) whether the
sanction involved an affi-mative disability or restraint; (2) whether it had historically been
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it was imposed only upon a finding of scienter; (4)
whether its operation would promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applied was already a crime; (6) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected was assignable for it; and (7)
whether it appeared excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id.
82. See Cheh, 42 Hastings L. J. at 1358 (cited in note 60) (stating that there has been no
subsequent case in which the factors resulted in a finding that a proceeding was "criminal for all
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States v. Ward,83 the Supreme Court re-examined its double jeopardy
analysis in the civil-criminal parallel proceedings context, again at-
tempting to conduct a meaningful inquiry as to whether a conse-
quence's effect was remedial or punitive. The Court added to the
statutory construction test a second inquiry: whether the intent and
label given the consequence by the legislature were negated by the
punitive purpose or effect of the statutory scheme.84 Nonetheless,
only the clearest proof under the second step would override the
legislative intent, as manifested through the use of a civil label.85 The
inquiry into the consequence's effect thus became illusory in prac-
tice,88 and the main focus remained on the legislative label and the
consequence's stated purpose,87 until the Court's landmark decision in
United States v. Halper.88
2. United States v. Halper: The Demise of the Statutory
Construction Test
In Halper, the Court held that consequences labeled civil under
the False Claims Act89 were actually punitive in operation, and there-
fore triggered double jeopardy protection.90 Departing from the statu-
tory construction test, the Court stated that in the context of the
"humane interests" safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's
proscription against multiple punishments, a violation can be identi-
fied only by addressing the character of the actual sanctions as im-
posed on the individual.9 1 The Court stated that where a civil conse-
constitutional purposes"); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365-66
(1984) (stating that the Mendoza-Martinez factors would be helpful in its characterization of the
consequence as penal or remedial, but finding that those factors, upon application, resulted in a
determination that the consequence was remedial and civil, just as Congress had labeled it).
83. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
84. Id. at 248. This two part test was utilized by the Supreme Court in later double jeop-
ardy decisions. See, for example, 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63, 365.
85. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). See
also 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365.
86. See generally Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1260-61 (cited in note 36) (summarizing the
result of the litigation following Mitchell and the tests and standards as they stood prior to
Halper); Jahncke, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 122-28 (cited in note 36) (same).
87. But see Cheh, 42 Hastings L. J. at 1364, n.209 (cited in note 60) (pointing out that the
legislative definition will not always control).
88. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
89. 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-31 (1982), as amended by the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986).
90. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-51.
91. Id. at 447. This language in the Court's opinion reaffirmed and revitalized the inher-
ent justification of the Double Jeopardy Clause as a safeguard of individual rights. It further
recognized the "intrinsically personal" nature of the double jeopardy protection, which had not
been of paramount importance in earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning double jeopardy
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quence bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
government for its loss,92 but appears to qualify only as punishment, 93
the defendant is entitled to an accounting4 of the government's
damages and costs to determine whether the second consequence in
fact constitutes a second punishment9 5
Halper thus entitles the government to "rough remedial jus-
tice" in a parallel civil proceeding, as it may recover damages and
costs due to the defendant's misconduct.96 The government may not,
however, impose a consequence labeled civil when in operation it
serves the goals of punishment97
When Kurth arose, Halper was the leading case applying
a double jeopardy analysis to civil penalties.98 The Kurth
majority99 found, however, that because Halper did not specifically
in parallel proceedings. See Clapp, 68 N.C. L. Rev. at 992 & n.17 (cited in note 45) (noting this
impc.-tant aspect of Halper).
92. It was on this point that the Court distinguished earlier cases which upheld civil
sanctions against double jeopardy challenges. The Court stated that the Halper decision would
affect only the rare case in which the penalty imposed greatly exceeds the damage caused by the
defendant's misconduct. As the Court reasoned, none of its earlier cases upholding civil sanc-
tions against double jeopardy challenges had involved such a disparity between the civil recov-
ery and the purported damages suffered by the government. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-46.
93. The Halper Court defined the goals of punishment as retribution and deterrence. Id.
at 448. Cheh defines non-punishment goals as recompense, regulation, or treatment. Cheh, 42
Hastings L. J. at 1378-79 (cited in note 60). In Huntington v. Attrill, the Court stated that it
would be helpful in defining punishment to look at whether the wrong is one against the public
or an individual, and whether the liability imposed is related to and limited by the actual
damages. 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892).
94. It is within the trial court's discretion to order and assess a government accounting.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50.
95. Id.
96. The Supreme Court acknowledged that calculating exact damages and costs would be
problematic. The Court nonetheless gave trial courts the discretion to order an accounting
when the defendant establishes a plausible second punishment double jeopardy claim, and
based on that accounting, to determine whether the size of the civil consequence had crossed the
line between remedy and punishment. Id. at 449-50; Cheh, 42 Hast. L. J. at 1378 n.281 (cited in
note 60).
97. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
98. Even so, scholars severely criticized Halper on the grounds that it muddled the two
prongs of double jeopardy protection by prohibiting multiple punishments in successive prose-
cutions, Kirgis, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 867 (cited in note 55), encouraged interference with
government assessment of various civil penalties, Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1267-68 (cited in
note 36); Clapp, 68 N.C. L. Rev. at 992-93 (cited in note 45), and possibly barred a criminal
action when the government had already imposed a civil penalty, Kirgis, 50 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. at 867; Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1272.
99. Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion, argued that Halper was the correct stan-
dard to apply, and upon application of its principles, concluded that the tax should be upheld
against a double jeopardy challenge. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1953-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See Part IV.C.
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address the issue of whether a tax may be characterized as punitive
for double jeopardy purposes, that case did not control.100
B. Taxes and the Constitution
Prior to Kurth, the Supreme Court had never found that a tax
statute violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.11 Originally the Court
refused to apply certain constitutional protections to taxes at all. For
example, in A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton,10 2 the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution did not limit the
legislature's taxing power unless the tax was so arbitrary that it fell
entirely outside the legislature's taxing power. 0 3 The Court stated
repeatedly that the mere fact that a tax statute regulated, deterred,
or discouraged conduct was not sufficient to remove the tax from the
taxing power of the legislature.04 The Court defined the proper role of
a tax as providing support for the government, and simply
characterized taxes that went beyond that function as penalties'05
subject to closer constitutional scrutiny as such.106
Notwithstanding the traditional deference afforded them, tax
statutes were by no means insulated from constitutional scrutiny.
The Court recognized that a tax on unlawful conduct could violate a
taxpayer's right against self-incrimination due to its reporting
requirements.107 Additionally, although the Court found the addition
100. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1944-45.
101. Id.
102. 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
103. Id. at 43-44.
104. See, for example, United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45-46 (1950) (holding that a
federal marijuana tax was not invalid because it regulated, deterred, and discouraged certain
conduct); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (stating that all taxes regulate
and deter and that the extent to which a tax restricts an activity or implements the hidden
motives of Congress is irrelevant so long as the statute is a valid exercise of the taxing power).
105. See Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 562 (1922) (finding that a tax provision of the
National Prohibition Act was a penalty); LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (same).
106. See Lipke, 259 U.S. at 562 (finding that a tax provision of the National Prohibition Act
was subject to due process requirements); United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. at 572
(remanding a tax provision of the National Prohibition Act to determine whether it violated the
Double Jeopardy or Self-Incrimination Clauses of the Constitution as a penalty). The Court also
avoided subjecting taxes to constitutional scrutiny in other ways. See, for example, United
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (holding that a federal excise tax on the sale of
liquor in violation of state law was a matter within the police powers of the states, rather than
the taxing power of the Congress).
107. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968) (holding that the reporting require-
ments of a federal occupational tax as applied to an illegal wagering business violated the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Federal Constitution).
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to tax in question to be valid in Mitchell, it did scrutinize the tax
statute under the Double Jeopardy Clause.108
Drug taxes have recently been the subject of many constitu-
tional challenges, both successful and unsuccessful.19 State courts
addressing the constitutionality of these taxes have sometimes char-
acterized them as serving the goals of punishment and deterrence.110
While the Supreme Court also recognized the deterrent and regula-
tory effect of the federal marijuana tax in United States v. Sanchez,"'
it found that fact to be of little constitutional consequence and upheld
the tax's validity."12 However, the Supreme Court may have perma-
nently altered its future treatment of constitutional challenges to
drug taxes with its decision in Kurth.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF MONTANA V. KURTH RANCH:
OPINIONS OF THE COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority in Kurth stated that Halper's determination of
when a civil penalty constitutes punishment for purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause did not control the determination of whether
Montana's tax had punitive characteristics which would subject it to
double jeopardy scrutiny."1 The Court nonetheless utilized Halper to
108. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398-405.
109. Micheal A. LeMay, Nebraska's Marijuana and Controlled Substances Tax Stamp Act
and Self-Incrimination: State v. Ganza, 27 Creighton L. Rev. 313, 331-36 (1993) (discussing
several successful and unsuccessful challenges to state drug taxes on the state level).
110. For statements of the deterrent and retributive characteristics of drug taxes, see Sims
v. State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992); Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue,
152 I1.2d 504, 605 N.E.2d 525, 531 (1992); State v. Gallup, 500 N.W. 2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993);
State v. Roberts, 384 N.W.2d 688, 691 (S.D. 1986); State v. Berberich, 284 Kan. 854, 811 P.2d
1192, 1200 (1991); State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 769 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1989).
111. 340 U.S. 42,44-46 (1950).
112. Id. at 45-46 (stating that the tax was nonetheless civil as it merely recovered the
expense of investigation and as it was collected in a civil proceeding).
113. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1944-45. The Court noted that were Halper the correct standard
to apply in this case, the Montana tax would still be struck down since the government did not
show that its assessment remotely approximated the costs of the defendant's violation or that it
was in any way rationally related to damages actually caused. Id. at 1948. Even though the
majority explicitly rejected Halper as controlling, some courts have read Kurth as applying and
extending Halper. See, for example, United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1464-65 (7th Cir.
1994); State v. Walker, 35 Conn. App. 431, 646 A-2d 209, 211 (1994).
Additionally, the Court noted that while taxes differ from sanctions due to their goal of
raising revenue, at some point the assessment labeled a "tax" may approach punishment, at
which point the Double Jeopardy Clause is invoked regardless of the different labels attached.
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justify its examination of a tax under the Double Jeopardy Clause." 4
Thus, although the majority refused to view Halper's reasoning as
controlling, it did adhere to its rejection of labels as dispositive of the
civil-criminal distinction.15 Moreover, the Court adopted Halper's
theory that the actual character of the sanctions" 6 determines
whether the true purpose and effect of the statute is punitive in na-
ture." 7 The Court then analyzed the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax
Act to determine whether it operated as a "punitive tax," thereby
invoking the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause."18
The Court concluded that the tax was indeed punitive, because
it contained several "unusual features" which deviated so far from the
operation of a normal revenue law that it became a form of punish-
ment." 9 These features included a high rate of taxation.2 and a de-
terrent purpose.' 2' The Court noted that although these two features
would not automatically mark the tax as a form of punishment, they
lent support to the characterization of the drug tax as a penalty. 22
The fact that the statute conditioned collection of the tax on the com-
mission of a crime further signaled a penal and prohibitory intent
Id. at 1946. See also A Magnano Co., 292 U.S. at 44 (stating that "there comes a time in the
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment) (citing Child
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).
114. The Court pointed out that it had never previously held that a tax violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause, but cited Mitchell for the proposition that one might. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at
1945-46, & n.16. As discussed in Part IIIA.1, the Mitchell Court faced a challenge to the civil
"additions to tax" imposed on Mitchell due to tax violations. While the Kurth Court stated that
these "additions" might have been better characterized as sanctions for tax fraud, it cited
Mitchell as support for a double jeopardy challenge to a tax, since, according to the majority, the
Mitchell Court described those additions interchangeably as a tax, a sanction, and an
assessment. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n.16 (citingMitchell, 303 U.S. at 396, 398, 405-06).
115. Id. at 1945, 1946.
116. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
117. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1946.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1947-48. In applying Kurth, courts have stated that the Supreme Court did not
intend to lay down a definitive test, and that a tax need not have all the punitive features of the
Montana tax in order to constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See, for example, Clifft v. Indiana Dept. of Revenue, 641 N.E.2d 682, 691-93 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1994).
120. The Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act imposed taxes at rates ranging from eight to
eight hundred percent of a drug's market value. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1943 n.12, 1946 n.17.
These rates result from the formula in The Montana Dangerous Drug Tax Act which provided
for assessment of the tax at the greater of ten percent of the drugs' market value or a per ounce
tax according to the type of drug possessed. See Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111(2).
121. The Act's preamble stated that the tax would provide for anticrime measures by
"burdening" the law breakers instead of the "law abiders." Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-122.
122. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1947. It appears that the Court's purpose in expressly noting that
these two features were not equivalent to a punitive consequence was to insulate "sin taxes,"
including a threatened increase in the cigarette tax, from double jeopardy challenge. See id. at
1946 n.17.
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rather than a revenue raising intent.123 The Court distinguished the
Montana tax from sin and mixed-motive taxes, where the government
has an interest in both deterring behavior and providing the economic
benefits of a product to the community.124
The Court also characterized the Montana tax as a form of
punishment for double jeopardy purposes because, although the stat-
ute purported to tax the possession of drugs, the drugs had already
been confiscated at the time the tax was assessed.125 Moreover, the
tax was exacted only after the taxpayer had been arrested for the
conduct giving rise to the tax in the first place.26 The majority's opin-
ion repeatedly made note of the fact that this statute, purportedly
intended to be a revenue raising tax, imposed a tax only upon crimi-
nals.127 Based upon these features, the Court concluded that the
Montana tax imposed a second punishment collected in the functional
equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution, thus subjecting the
Kurths to a second penalty for the same offense x28
The Court left open several questions of constitutional import.
First, the Court did not address the fact that only Richard Kurth had
been judged guilty of the possession count and was therefore the only
one actually subject to a second punishment for the illegal conduct of
drug possession.29 Second, the Court did not address the issue of
whether a subsequent criminal action would be barred by a prior
123. Id. at 1947. The Court distinguished the federal marijuana tax since it was condi-
tioned not upon criminal drug conduct, but upon failing to pay the tax, and therefore retained
its civil characteristics. Id. at 1947 n.20 (citing Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 45).
124. Id. at 1947.
125. Id. at 1948.
126. Id. at 1942, 1947.
127. Id. at 1947-48.
128. Id. at 1948. Important to double jeopardy analysis and the future application of this
case is the fact that the Supreme Court framed this issue as falling under the multiple punish-
ments prong of double jeopardy protection. Id. at 1945-46. After outlining the factors which
characterized the tax as a punishment, however, the Court stated that due to the criminal
nature of the tax, the second proceeding in which it was assessed must be the equivalent of a
successive criminal prosecution. Id. at 1948. This mixing of the two protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause began in Halper. See Kirgis, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 867 (cited in note 55).
The implication may be that whenever a consequence is deemed criminal the proceeding also
becomes criminal, thus invoking all the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant.
129. The other members of the Kurth family were found guilty only on the conspiracy
count. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1942 n.9. The Court did not address this issue since it was not
raised below, but when evaluating the case this fact is quite important to the precedent's value.
If the others had never incurred a criminal consequence for possession, a subsequent civil, or
criminal, consequence for that act would not raise a multiple prosecution or punishment
problem, since the consequences would be based on completely different conduct, i.e.,
conspiracy.
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collection of a punitive civil consequence. 1"0 And finally, the Court did
not address the possible implications of multiple punishments im-
posed in the same proceeding. 13
B. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Although he dissented, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the
majority on several key points. First, he too rejected the statutory
construction test and inquired into the actual purpose and effect of
the tax. 32 Second, he agreed that Halper was an inappropriate prece-
dent for this case since the purpose of a civil penalty (to recover costs),
differs from that of a tax (to raise revenue). 3' Justice Rehnquist also
acquiesced in the majority's statement that a tax could cross the
threshold and become, in effect, a penalty."14 He fundamentally dis-
agreed, however, with the majority's finding that the Montana tax
under consideration crossed that line.13
In addition, Justice Rehnquist objected to the majority's read-
ing of and reliance upon Mitchell. Whereas the majority cited
Mitchell as supporting its application of double jeopardy analysis to a
tax, 36 Justice Rehnquist stated that Mitchell concerned an addition to
tax, or tax penalty, and that the majority's reference to Mitchell was
simply unwarranted."37 Justice Rehnquist therefore stated that the
Court had never previously contemplated subjecting a tax statute to
double jeopardy analysis.38
Justice Rehnquist's review of the Court's past decisions con-
cerning taxes and constitutional protections led him to the conclusion
that such challenges were regularly turned aside by the Supreme
Court." 9 He cited prior cases that stated that taxes may be enacted to
deter or even suppress the taxed activity14 0 and that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or deters
the activity taxed.'4 ' Justice Rehnquist therefore objected to the ma-
130. Id. at 1947 n.21. This same question was left open by Halper. See Glickman, 76 Va.
L. Rev. at 1272 (cited in note 36). See also note 188 and accompanying text.
131. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1947 n.21.
132. Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 1949-50.
134. Id. at 1951.
135. Id at 1951-52.
136. Id at 1946 n.16.
137. Id. at 1949 n.1
138. Id at 1949.
139. Id. at 1950.
140. Id. at 1949-50.
141. Id. at 1950 (citing Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44).
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jority's holding that a deterrent purpose and high rate will mark a tax
as a punishment.142
After attacking the majority's scrutiny and invalidation of a
tax statute under the Double Jeopardy Clause, Justice Rehnquist
criticized the "hodgepodge of criteria"'1' relied upon by the majority to
characterize the Montana tax as a punishment. First, Justice
Rehnquist confronted the majority's reliance on the fact that the
Montana tax was conditioned upon the commission of a crime.44
According to Justice Rehnquist, the practice of assessing and collect-
ing the tax only after arrest simply recognized the reality that a tax-
payer would not voluntarily file a tax return to reflect the amount of
illegal drugs he possessed.4 5 He also found the majority's distinction
between mixed-motive or sin taxes and taxes on completely illegal
activities to be illusory.146
Next, Justice Rehnquist discussed the majority's reliance on
the fact that the taxpayer no longer had possession of the drugs on
which he was paying a "possession" tax.147 He stated that in this in-
stance the majority exalted form over substance.4 8  Although the
Montana tax is described as a tax on storage and possession, it was
clearly passed in order to raise revenue from the profitable under-
ground drug business,49 and therefore actual and current possession
was unnecessary under the Act.150
As to the alleged high rate of taxation, Justice Rehnquist com-
pared the rate in Kurth to that in United States v. Constantine,51
where an excise tax on the sale of alcohol forty times greater than the
normal retail tax152 was invalidated as a penalty.5 3 Justice Rehnquist
stated that Constantine clearly supported upholding the Montana tax
since, unlike the sale of alcohol in Constantine, the entire illegal drug
142. Id. at 1949-50.
143. Id. at 1949.
144. Id. at 1947.
145. Id. at 1950 & n.2. In support of this point Justice Rehnquist noted that other
voluntary and anonymous taxing schemes have failed to raise revenue. Id.
146. Id. at 1950-51.
147. Id. at 1951.
148. Id.
149. The preamble to the Montana Act stated that it was appropriate to tax drug related
offenses due to the economic impact of manufacturing, selling, and use of such substances. Id.
at 1941 n.4 (citing 1987 Mont. Laws, ch. 563, p. 1416).
150. Id.
151. 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
152. Id. at 295.
153. Id. at 295-96.
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enterprise went untaxed.M In addition, the rate of the Montana tax
was not as disproportionate as the excise tax in Constantine.15 While
the majority believed that the tax rate imposed on the Kurths
constituted a punishment because it was "unrivaled,"''5  Justice
Rehnquist stated that a tax became punishment only if the rate was
so high that the tax could only be explained as serving a punitive
purpose. 57 He concluded that the Montana rate58 did not reach that
point especially when compared to the rate of valid sin taxes.16 9
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the tax statute had legitimate, non-
penal, revenue-raising, and deterrent purposes, and that it should
therefore be insulated from double jeopardy scrutiny completely.160
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor based her dissent upon the premise that a
tax could be subject to double jeopardy analysis. Recognizing the
great possibility that the state would use a drug tax to punish a de-
fendant twice for the same crime, she found no constitutional distinc-
tion between a fine and a drug tax under double jeopardy analysis.161
Justice O'Connor then sought to determine whether the Montana
drug tax actually violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. To make this
determination, Justice O'Connor applied the Halper test, asking
whether the sanction was truly civil, or whether it instead served the
goals of punishment and was excessive in relation to the damages
caused by the defendant's conduct.162
Justice O'Connor characterized the Montana tax as a civil
consequence, or liquidated damage award, which approximated the
damages caused by the Kurths and generated by the larger war on
drugs.16 3  These damages included $27 billion spent by state and
154. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1946 n.17.
157. Id. at 1952.
158. Id. at 1951-52. Justice Rehnquist noted that the higher quality marijuana was taxed
at a rate of only eighty percent of market value, and stated that even a four hundred percent
rate would not be dispositive of the punitive issue. Id.
159. Id. at 1952. It is noteworthy that while the majority strained to distinguish the
Montana tax from sin taxes, Justice Rehnquist placed the Montana tax along side sin taxes,
defending the validity of both. Id. at 1952.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1952-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




federal governments on drug control activities every year 64 and at
least $120,000 for the apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration of
the Kurths in Montana. 165 Justice O'Connor then stated that the
government is not required to prove exact damages in order to collect
a purely civil fine,16  and concluded that the assessments made in the
Montana Act were fair and valid approximations.167
Justice O'Connor directly addressed the court of appeals' find-
ing that an accounting of the government's damages was necessary,
and lacking, in this case.16 Outlining the Halper test, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that a government accounting is only required
after the defendant has proven that the sanction bears no rational
relationship to compensating the government for its loss. 69 Since the
Kurths never met this initial burden of proof in the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings, no accounting was required.170
Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's refusal to apply
Halper's reasoning to the Kurth's case would have a far-reaching and
negative impact. 17 She predicted that the majority's decision would
bar states from imposing drug taxes on those punished for a posses-
sory drug offense,72 would entitle a taxpayer to all the constitutional
protections afforded a criminal defendant during a tax collection
proceeding,"73 and would cause law-abiding citizens to bear the burden
of reimbursing the government for the immense costs incurred in
prosecuting criminal drug activityY4 Instead of effecting an unwar-
ranted expansion of double jeopardy jurisprudence, Justice O'Connor
determined that the Court should rely on the Excessive Fines Clause
to protect criminals from potential governmental overreaching.175
164. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fact Sheet: Drug Data
Summary 5 (April 1994).
165. Montana Board of Crime Control, Per-Unit and Per-Transaction Expenditures in the
Montana Criminal Justice System 8, 15, 19, 21, 22-23, and Tables 21, 23 (1993) ('Montana
Criminal Justice Expenditures).
166. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Rex Trailer Co., 350 U.S. at
153-54 (stating that the amount of damages may be difficult or impossible to ascertain); Halper,
490 U.S. at 452-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that a penalty roughly proportionate to the
damage caused is valid).
167. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1954 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1954-55.
170. Id. at 1955.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. Justice O'Connor based this prediction on the majority's characterization of the
second proceeding in the Kurth case as the functional equivalent of a second criminal prosecu-
tion. See note 128 and accompanying text.




D. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia's opinion departed significantly from both the
majority and dissenting opinions in that he refused to recognize any
multiple punishment prong of double jeopardy protection.176 To sup-
port his contention, Justice Scalia read Ex Parte Lange,1'7 the first
case to articulate this protection,1' 8 as a Due Process Clause case.'7 9
Justice Scalia characterized the decision this way because the
"multiple punishments" involved in Lange were not authorized by the
legislature to be imposed cumulatively.180 Therefore, the imposition of
both civil and criminal consequences violated the Due Process
Clause's guarantee of prior legislative authorization for punish-
ment. 81
In addition, Justice Scalia noted that all cases subsequent to
Lange that are considered to be multiple punishment cases actually
dealt with this lack of legislative authorization under the Due Process
Clause. 82 According to Justice Scalia, the defendants in these cases
need not have advanced a multiple punishment claim to establish a
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because they subjected the
defendants to a second criminal prosecution, the statutes in these
cases independently violated the multiple prosecution prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.' 83
Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the Court did not actu-
ally create and apply the multiple punishment prohibition'4 until
Halper.85 Justice Scalia stated that Halper was decided in plain
error, because it extended the Double Jeopardy Clause to prohibit
multiple punishments in successive civil proceedings, a result not
forbidden by the language of the amendment.186 To Justice Scalia, the
dangers of this unwarranted extension of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's protections to encompass civil consequences were obvious.
176. Id. at 1955, 1956-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. 85 U.S. (18 Wall) at 163.
178. Id. at 172-73.
179. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1956 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1956-57 (citing In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50, 51-52 (1943); Ohio v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 493, 499 (1984); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1980); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980)).
183. Id. at 1957.
184. Justice Scalia refers to the multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause
as the "Halper-created multiple punishments prohibition." Id. at 1958.




First, it forced lower courts to determine at what specific dollar
amount a civil and remedial consequence becomes a criminal and
punitive consequence. 187 Second, it set the precedential basis for find-
ing that a successive criminal procedure is barred by a prior civil
procedure. 188 Justice Scalia believed that the same protections and
rights protected by the so-called multiple punishment prong of the
Double Jeopardy Clause could be protected through application of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Excessive Fines, and Due Process
Clauses, as well as the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition of suc-
cessive criminal prosecutions.1 9
Responding to the majority opinion, Justice Scalia stated that
although the opinion was clothed in multiple punishment language,
the majority actually concluded that since the tax was punitive, it
must, of necessity, have been collected in a second criminal proceed-
ing.190 This collection of the tax after criminal proceedings had oc-
curred constituted a violation of the multiple prosecution protection of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9'
Justice Scalia next stated that the majority's statements
equating retribution and deterrence with punishment for double
jeopardy purposes constituted an extreme deviation from precedent. 92
Using language from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez193 and United
States v. Ward, 94 Justice Scalia stated that the key question in Kurth
was whether the proceeding, rather than the consequence, was crim-
inal.195 According to Justice Scalia, although the Kennedy-Ward test
did consider whether a consequence served the goals of retribution
and deterrence, that factor was only one among many. Therefore,
that factor was not dispositive of the double jeopardy inquiry, as the
Kurth majority had found it to be. 96 Justice Scalia also criticized the
majority for failing to reconcile its decision with Mitchell's validation
187. Id. at 1958.
188. Id. at 1958-59. Justice Scalia pointed out that the lower courts have refused to allow
this result to flow from the reasoning of Halper, citing United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143 (3d
Cir. 1993) and United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly,
courts have noted that Kurth did not resolve this question. See Clifft, 641 N.E.2d at 693 n.16.
But see Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that double jeopardy
barred a criminal trial after a pretrial civil forfeiture was assessed from the defendant).
189. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1959-60.
193. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
194. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).




of the collection of severe tax sanctions in civil proceedings. 197 Finally,
Justice Scalia noted that the reasoning of the majority was internally
inconsistent if it truly held that a tax proceeding was the functional
equivalent of a criminal prosecution. 198 If that statement were true,
argued Justice Scalia, then the tax would be invalid without any ref-
erence to the Double Jeopardy Clause, because imposing criminal
consequences in a civil proceeding is simply unconstitutional.199
Justice Scalia concluded that the tax proceeding was civil under a
proper application of the Kennedy-Ward test, that the collection of the
tax and the imposition of criminal consequences did not violate the
Due Process Clause's requirement of legislative authorization,200 and
therefore, that there was no constitutional violation in the proceed-
ings against the Kurths.20 1
V. THE KURTH DECISION AND TAX FRAuD
As noted in Part I, the impact of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Kurth has been the subject of much speculation and uncertainty.2 2
Soon after the decision was handed down, several commentators
speculated as to its potential impact on Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions imposing an addition to tax for taxpayer fraud.2 3 These addi-
tions to tax204 are commonly referred to, and considered to be, civil
penalties205 and may thus be collected in combination with the crim-
inal consequences 20 6 imposed for tax fraud without violating the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
197. Id. at 1960.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Justice Scalia interprets the multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to require this due process requirement of legislative authorization. See notes 176-183,
and accompanying text. Since the legislature indeed authorized the taxes in addition to the
criminal consequences, no violation occurred.
201. Id.
202. See note 3 and authorities cited therein.
203. I.R.C. § 6663 (CCH, 1994). See, for example, Tigue and Lacewell, 211 N.Y. L. J. at 1
(cited in note 3); Rosenblatt, 17 Legal Times at 23 (cited in note 3).
204. I.R.C. §§ 7206-07 (CCH, 1994).
205. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 399, 401-402; 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 433 (1882); 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 398
(1901); Rosenblatt, 17 Legal Times at 23-24 (cited in note 3); Tigue and Lacewell, 211 N.Y. L. J.
at 4 (cited in note 3).
206. See, for example, Barnette v. Commissioner, 95 Tax Ct. 341, 347-48 (1990) (requiring
the defendant to pay civil addition to tax fines as well as criminal penalties). For a more
extensive discussion of the relationship between the civil and criminal consequences for tax
fraud see Parts V.A and V.B.
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However, if the Court applied Kurth to these additions to tax,
it could reach a contrary conclusion under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. This contrary conclusion would be at odds with Mitchell,20 7 in
which the Supreme Court upheld additions to tax against a double
jeopardy challenge,208 and would nullify similar dispositions of double
jeopardy challenges to additions to tax by lower courts.20 9 Moreover,
the Kurth Court's use of Mitchell itself to support its examination and
eventual invalidation of a tax statute under the Double Jeopardy
Clause210 explicitly calls into question the continuing validity of
Mitchell.
A. Anatomy of a Tax Fraud Case
If a taxpayer is suspected of fraud, and the Criminal
Investigation Division of the IRS approves an investigation,211 an
agent is assigned to the case,212 and the tax fraud procedure begins.213
After the agent has completed her investigation of the taxpayer's
activities and prosecution is recommended, a report is prepared and
submitted to the regional counsel's office. 21 4 If the regional counsel
reaches the same determination concerning prosecution, the report is
sent to the Department of Justice.215 If the Department of Justice also
recommends prosecution, the case is sent to the appropriate attorney
general for indictment.216
207. 303 U.S. at 399-406.
208. Id. The additions to tax discussed below are the functional equivalent of those
addressed in Mitchell, prior to the rate increase from fifty to seventy-five percent. See notes
232-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the rate increase see Part V.C.1.b.
209. See Part V.B for a detailed discussion of several courts' holdings that imposition of
both civil and criminal consequences for tax fraud does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
210. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n.16.
211. A need to investigate may be indicated by informers' tips, discoveries by revenue
agents, and even suspicion of classes of taxpayers. James J. Freeland, Stephen A. Lind and
Richard B. Stephens, Cases and Materials on Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 1019
n.3 (Foundation, 8th ed. 1994).
212. The agent who completes the investigation is called the revenue agent, but she is
under the direct control of a special agent. Id. at 1019-1020.
213. This outline of the tax fraud procedure is extremely basic and rudimentary and is
meant only to familiarize the reader with the general procedures which precede the actual tax
fraud case. For a more detailed explanation, see George D. Crowley, The Role of the Practitioner
When His Client Faces a Criminal Tax Fraud Investigation, 40 J. Tax 18, 18-24 (1974); Ray A.
Knight and Lee G. Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 175
(1992).
214. Freeland, Lind, and Stephens, Cases and Materials at 1020 (cited in note 211).
215. Id.
216. Id. See also Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 184-191 (cited in note 213)
(providing a detailed overview of the entire procedure).
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Throughout this process the taxpayer is afforded conferences
with the officials conducting the investigation to discuss the allega-
tions against him or her.217 The taxpayer is entitled to constitutional
safeguards such as the privilege against self-incrimination and
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.218  The
purpose of this investigatory process is to determine whether the
taxpayer has committed civil219 or criminal 220 tax fraud, as the
statutory provisions define those violations in the Internal Revenue
Code (the "Code").
There are two characteristics of the tax fraud proceedings that
are of particular importance to this Recent Development. First, since
the Code provides for both civil and criminal consequences for tax
fraud, parallel proceedings frequently arise. Second, a taxpayer is
precluded from denying fraudulent intent in a civil proceeding if such
intent has been found in a previous criminal proceeding.
1. Parallel Proceedings
The Code contains both civil and criminal consequences for tax
fraud. The occurrence of a parallel proceeding22l in this context is
quite common, because most criminal tax fraud investigations occur
in conjunction with civil tax fraud investigations.22 2 Code section 6663
contains the civil consequences, while sections 7206 and 7207 contain
the criminal consequences. 223 Those actions proscribed by section
7206 constitute a felony224 and are punishable by a fine of not more
217. Freeland, Lind and Stephens, Cases and Materials at 1020-1021 (cited in note 211).
218. Id. at 1026. See generally Daniel J. Cramer, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations by
Grand Jury, 61 U. Detroit J. Urban L. 215 (1984) (discussing the protections afforded a tax-
payer in an IRS investigation, as compared to those in a grand jury investigation for tax fraud);
Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 211-216 (cited in note 213) (discussing the protections
afforded taxpayers during fraud investigations).
219. The civil tax fraud consequences and elements are found in I.R.C. § 6663. This provi-
sion will be discussed in detail in Part V.A.1.
220. The criminal tax fraud consequences and elements are found in I.R.C. §§ 7206-07.
These provisions will be discussed in detail in Part V.A.1.
221. A parallel proceeding occurs when both civil and criminal consequences are imposed
upon the same defendant for the same misconduct in separate proceedings. For a discussion of
this concept see Part IIIA.
222. Cramer, 61 U. Detroit J. Urban L. at 215 (cited in note 218).
223. Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 178-79 (cited in note 213).
224. The activities categorized as felonious tax fraud are as follows: (1) making a false
declaration under penalty of peijury; (2) willfully aiding or assisting in the preparation or filing
of a document which is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; (3) fraudulently signing or
executing any IRS document, or procuring the same; (4) concealing property with the intent to
evade or defeat the tax imposed by its title; (5) making any false statement, concealing property,
or falsifying or destroying records in connection with a compromise or closing agreement. I.R.C.
§ 7206.
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than $100,000,225 or imprisonment for not more than three years, or
both,226 plus interest 227 and the costs of prosecution.228  The actions
proscribed by section 7207 constitute a misdemeanor,229 punishable by
a fine of not more than $10,000,230 or imprisonment for not more than
one year, or both.231
Common to each of these criminal provisions is the element of
a voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, signified
in each section by the word "willfully. '232 Therefore, the Supreme
Court has stated that the only distinction between the two criminal
provisions is the additional acts of misconduct required for a felony
conviction.23 As actions under these sections are criminal offenses,
the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.2U
Section 6663 authorizes the imposition of additions to tax for
fraud.235 Specifically, this provision increases the tax due by seventy-
five percent of any fraudulent underpayment.2 6 If any portion of the
underpayment is due to fraud, there is a presumption that the entire
underpayment is fraudulent s.2 3  The taxpayer must prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that some portion of the underpayment is
not attributable to fraud in order to avoid the addition being assessed
against the entire underpayment.238
Because this addition to tax is determined by the amount of
underpayment, it is a necessary prerequisite to its collection that
225. For corporations found to violate the provision, the fine is not more than $500,000.
I.R.C. § 7206.
226. Id.
227. Section 6601 states that if any taxes are not paid by their due date, interest will be as-
sessed on the amount of taxes due, but not paid, at the rate set by section 6621 for the period of
time between the due date and the date on which the taxes are actually paid. I.R.C. § 6601
(CCH 1994).
228. I.R.C. § 7206.
229. The activity proscribed by this section includes willful delivery or disclosure of
fraudulent lists, returns, accounts, statements or other documents and willfully failing to
comply with public inspection requirements for tax-exempt and private foundations. I.R.C. §
7207.
230. For corporations that violate this provision, the fine is not more than $50,000. Id.
231. Id.
232. See I.R.C. §§ 7206-07.
233. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 358-61 (1973). See Knight and Knight, 57 Mo.
L. Rev. at 180-81 (cited in note 213) (discussing the differences between the two criminal
provisions).
234. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970).
235. I.R.C. § 6663.
236. Id. at § 6663(a).
237. Id. at § 6663(b).
238. Id.
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there be an underpayment of tax, or a deficiency.239 Instead of operat-
ing under the criminal burden of proof, imposition of the fraud
penalty is based upon proof by clear and convincing evidence 40 that
the taxpayer engaged in intentional wrongdoing with the specific
intent to avoid a tax known to be due by actions aimed at concealing
or otherwise preventing collection of the tax.241 Once this burden of
proof is established, the civil consequence may be imposed242 without
meeting the higher standard of proof required in a criminal case and
without the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defen-
dant.243
Establishing the fraudulent intent of the taxpayer is rarely
possible through presentation of direct evidence,'244 and so the IRS has
sought to determine the forms of conduct sufficient to justify a finding
of tax fraud. Circumstantial evidence of fraud includes un-
derstatement of income, inadequate records, failure to file tax re-
turns, implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior, conceal-
ing assets, and failure to cooperate with tax authorities. 245 A pattern
239. 14 Standard Fed. Tax Rptr. at 1 40,558.01 (CCH, 1995).
240. Mosteller v. Commissioner, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 758, 761-63 (1986).
241. Id. at 762. See also Akland v. Commissioner, 767 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1985);
Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit recently
stated that the Service must prove the person acted with specific intent to defraud the
government in the enforcement of its tax laws. United States v. Salerno, 902 F.2d 1429, 1432
(9th Cir. 1990). However, the Tax Court recently articulated the Service's burden of proof as
requiring proof first of intent to evade tax, and second of either the likely taxable source of the
income or disproof of the taxpayer's alleged non-taxable source. Parks v.Commissioner, 94 Tax
Ct. 654, 660-64 (1990). This disproof need not be in the form of contrary testimony or direct
proof. Instead, the Service may merely show that the taxpayer's story is implausible and
inconsistent with its reconstruction of the taxpayer's income and any other objective evidence.
Id.
242. There is no statute of limitations for imposing this civil consequence. I.R.C. § 6501(c)
(CCH, 1994).
243. Criminal defendants must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in United
States jurisdictions. See note 234 and accompanying text. As to the absence of criminal
constitutional protections in civil suits, see Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 211-16 (cited
in note 213) (discussing the protections that are given taxpayers during criminal tax fraud
investigations). See also Guzzetta v. Commissioner, 78 Tax Ct. 173, 178-79 (1982) (allowing
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause to be
admitted in a civil tax fraud case); Adamson v. Commissioner, 745 F.2d 541, 545-46 (1984)
(similar); Connell v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 925, 926 (1984) (finding that
statements could not be suppressed under claims of self-incrimination because the proceeding
was for civil penalties, rather than criminal consequences); McAlpine v. Commissioner, 47 Tax
Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1403, 1410 (1984) (similar).
244. To qualify as direct, evidence must provide unquestionable proof of the willful omis-
sion of a specific item of income. Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 191-92 (cited in note
213).
245. Bradford, 796 F.2d at 303; Edelson v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1987).
See also Peter Barton, The Criteria the Tax Court Uses in Determining if the Taxpayer is Liable
for the Fraud Penalty, 37 Drake L. Rev. 445, 448-455 (1988) (discussing each of these factors in
greater detail).
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of such activity constitutes strong and sometimes determinative evi-
dence246 that a taxpayer has committed fraud,247 especially when com-
bined with overt acts aimed at concealing the fraudulent behavior.248
Courts have accepted well-pled facts in either deemed admissions or
default judgments to support imposition of civil consequences
forfraud.249 Once fraudulent intent is proven by clear and convincing
evidence, the IRS may collect civil additions to tax.250
2. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, commonly referred to as issue preclusion,
allows a court to prevent the re-litigation of an issue determined to
have been settled in a previous case.251 As applied to the parallel
proceedings which occur in tax fraud cases, the doctrine precludes the
re-litigation of fraudulent intent in a civil suit for the addition to tax
if the taxpayer has been previously convicted under a criminal tax
fraud provision.252 Although courts originally allowed the taxpayer to
deny fraud in a subsequent civil suit,253 they now apply the doctrine
mechanically and with less regard for equitable considerations in the
246. Mosteller, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 763.
247. For a contrary result, see Wiseley v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 263, 266-67 (1950)
(holding that a doctor's substantial understatement of income in two consecutive years was not
sufficient to show fraud since there were factors making it impossible for him to keep accurate
records).
248. Parks, 94 Tax Ct. at 664-65.
249. Smith v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1470, 1476-79 (1991). However, it should not be
assumed that a finding of fraud is somehow a formality or automatic. See Mosteller, 52 Tax Ct.
Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 763 (stating that mere suspicion of fraud is not adequate to meet the IRS's
burden of proof); Nard v. Commissioner, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 476, 483 (1986) (stating
that a taxpayer's history of failure to file returns was not determinative to the fraud question);
Forman v. Commissioner, 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 139, 140 (1988) (concluding that because
the taxpayer's unreported income could be offset against his unclaimed deductions, he was not
guilty of fraud).
250. Walter B. Cox v. Commissioner, 50 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 317 (CCH) (1985).
251. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). The doctrine requires that
the issue be identical to that in the subsequent suit, be actually adjudicated by a valid and final
judgment, and be essential to reaching the first judgment. The doctrine also requires that the
party to the original action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Gray v.
Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1983); Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 810
(1st Cir. 1981); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 305-07 (7th Cir. 1972); Amos v.
Commissioner, 43 Tax Ct. 50, 54 (1964), affd, 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1965).
252. Grey, 708 F.2d at 245-46; Fontneau, 654 F.2d at 10; Plunkett, 465 F.2d at 305-07;
Amos, 43 Tax Ct. at 54 (1964). One exception to this general rule of issue preclusion is that a
criminal conviction under I.R.C. § 7206(1) which does not include a finding of intent to evade
taxes, as is required under the civil provisions, will not preclude the litigation of fraudulent
intent in a subsequent civil proceding. Cox, 50 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 324. See also
Barton, 37 Drake L. Rev. at 455 (cited in note 245) (noting this distinction).
253. Blackwell v. Commissioner, 20 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 599, 617-18 (1961); Slater
Est. v. Commissioner, 21 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1355, 1390 (1962).
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tax fraud context than in other areas of the law.2M Therefore, not only
can the IRS currently collect both civil and criminal tax penalties
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause,255 but it is usually also
relieved of the obligation to even litigate the issue of fraudulent intent
in a civil case subsequent to a criminal conviction.
B. The Addition to Tax and Constitutional Challenges
Constitutional challenges to the additions to tax for fraud have
generally failed. Courts, in rejecting such challenges, have applied
the reasoning that since the additions to tax are unquestionably es-
tablished by the legislature as civil consequences, the procedure must
also be civil, and therefore certain constitutional provisions do not
apply. For example, taxpayers' attempts to invoke the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures2 56 have failed on the
ground that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to civil proceed-
ings.257 Similarly, statements obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment 58 during the course of a criminal tax investigation have
been admitted in civil tax fraud actions, because the proceeding and
consequence is purely civil.259 Challenges based upon constitutional
prohibitions of ex post facto laws260 and excessive fines261 have been
similarly unsuccessful because of the reasoning that these additions
to tax were civil, not criminal, and therefore did not implicate consti-
tutional protections.
Of most interest in the aftermath of Kurth, however, are those
cases that deny double jeopardy protection when the additions to tax
254. Kathleen H. Musslewhite, Comment, The Application of Collateral Estoppel in the Tax
Fraud Context: Does it Meet the Requirement of Fairness and Equity?, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 643,
648 (1984) (discussing in great detail the application of collateral estoppel in the tax fraud case).
255. See Part V.B for a discussion of this issue.
256. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated..." U.S. Const., Amend. IV.
257. Guzzetta, 78 Tax Ct. at 178-79 (allowing evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause to be admitted in a civil tax fraud case); Adamson, 745
F.2d at 541 (similar).
258. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: "...nor shall [any person] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. ." U.S. Const., Amend. V.
259. Connell, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 926 (finding that certain statements could not
be supressed under claims of self-incrimination because the proceeding was for civil penalties,
rather than criminal consequences); McAlpine, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1410 (similar);
Spaulding v. Commissioner, 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1619, 1623 (1988) (similar).
260. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 Tax Ct. 858, 878 (1991) (stating that the ex post facto
prohibition applies only to criminal statutes, and is therefore inapplicable to an increase in the
civil addition to tax for fraud).
261. Thomas v. Commissioner, 67 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 2511, 2514-15 (1994) (finding
the Excessive Fines Clause to be inapplicable to assessment of the additions to tax for fraud).
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for fraud are sought after a criminal tax fraud conviction has been
obtained. Courts have consistently held that since the civil additions
to tax for fraud are remedial, rather than punitive, the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit their collection.262 After Kurth,
however, use of that standard and reasoning may be inappropriate.
C. Application of the Kurth Decision to the Collection of Additions to
Tax For Fraud
1. The Majority Opinion
As noted, the Supreme Court has previously addressed a dou-
ble jeopardy challenge to the additions to tax for fraud imposed in the
Code.263 In Mitchell, the Supreme Court, applying the statutory
construction test,214 held that additions to tax for fraud could not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the intent of Congress
was to impose a remedial, and therefore civil, consequence.265
However, the Supreme Court applied Mitchell in Kurth not to
reaffirm its rejection of a double jeopardy challenge to the additions to
tax for fraud, but instead to justify the Court's scrutiny of a tax
statute under the Double Jeopardy Clause.266
Most notably, the Kurth majority interpreted Mitchell as mak-
ing no distinction for double jeopardy purposes between taxes, sanc-
tions, and additions to tax.267 This characterization of the additions to
tax for fraud is consistent with section 6665(a) of the Code, which
states that additions to tax shall be treated, assessed, collected, and
paid in the same manner as taxes, and that any reference in the Code
262. This reasoning reflects that of the Halper test discussed previously in this Recent
Development. See Part IIA.2. See, for example, Barnette, 95 Tax Ct. at 341; Thomas, 67 Tax
Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 2513-14; Colopy v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 1087, 1091
(1984), Mason v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 805 (1984).
263. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 398-405 (holding that assessment of the addition to tax for fraud
after a criminal acquittal for tax fraud did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause).
264. The Court stated that "[t]he question for decision is... whether [the statute in ques-
tion] imposes a criminal sanction. That question is one of statutory construction." Id. at 399.
As discussed previously in this Recent Development, this test was highly deferential to the
legislature's labeling of a consequence and rarely resulted in successful double jeopardy
challenges to "civil" consequences. See Part IIIA.1.
265. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 401.
266. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n.16.
267. Id. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, took issue with this use of Mitchell by the major-
ity. He stated that the majority's reading of Mitchell was incorrect and that Mitchell had no
applicability to a case involving taxes, as it was a case involving civil sanctions, or penalties. Id.
at 1949 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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to tax also refers to additions to tax.268 Considering that the Kurth
majority and the Code equate the additions to tax for fraud with taxes
themselves, it would be plausible to argue that the additions to tax for
fraud are now controlled by Kurth and thus barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.289
a. A High Rate of Taxation
The majority in Kurth considered the high rates of taxation
imposed by the Montana drug tax to be consistent with, although not
dispositive of, a punitive character.270 The rate of the addition to tax
for fraud under the Code is seventy-five percent of the underpayment,
all of which is presumed to be due to fraud once the government
proves that any portion of the underpayment is due to fraud.271 When
compared to the rates imposed by the Montana tax which the Court
labeled high enough to be punitive, the additions to tax for fraud
appear to be punitive as well. Under the Montana Dangerous Drug
Tax Act, the tax rates ranged from eighty to eight hundred percent of
the market value of various drugs.272 The Court specifically stated
that a four hundred percent rate was "unrivaled" and that the eight
hundred percent rate was "remarkably" high.27 3 While the Court
recognized that the rate under the Montana tax could be surpassed by
the proposed increase in the cigarette "sin tax" it did not state what
impact such an increase would have on its decision.274
Therefore, the Court did not draw an explicit line at the point
where the Montana tax rates became high enough to be described as
consistent with a punitive character.275 While there is language in the
opinion suggesting that the eighty percent rate might have been
acceptable,276 one might interpret the opinion as holding that all the
268. I.R.C. § 6665(a) (1)-(2) (CCH, 1994). The heading of this section is "Additions Treated
as Tax." Id. The Kurth Court's use of Mitchell, combined with the clear language of the Code,
would seem to override any reliance on the statements of the Attorney General in 1882 and
1901 that the addition to tax was a penalty, not a tax. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 433; 23 Op. Att'y Gen.
398.
269. The unique features that the Court relied upon in Kurth were a high rate of taxation,
a deterrent purpose, being conditioned on the commission of a crime and exacted only after
arrest, and being assessed on the possession of something of which the taxpayer no longer has
possession. Kurth, 114 U.S. at 1947-48.
270. Id.
271. I.R.C. § 6663(a)-(b). See notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
272. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1943 n.12, 1946 n.17.
273. Id. at 1946 & n.17.
274. Id. at 1946 n.17.
275. Id. at 1946.
276. Id. at 1946 n.17.
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rates under the Montana tax were punitive, including the eighty
percent rate. If the opinion does indeed invalidate all the rates, then
the addition to tax for fraud, imposed at a seventy-five percent rate
and comparable to the lower rates imposed under the Montana
Dangerous Drug Tax Act, may be fairly characterized as punitive.
Under this reading of the case, then, the addition to tax for fraud is
imposed at a rate which is consistent with a punitive character.
b. Deterrent Purpose
The majority in Kurth also considered the deterrent purpose of
the Montana drug tax to be consistent with, although not dispositive
of, a punitive character.277 The Court stated that it was beyond ques-
tion that the Montana drug tax was intended to deter people from
participating in illegal drug activity.278 It is equally beyond question
that the additions to tax for fraud are intended to deter taxpayers
from committing tax fraud.279 When Congress changed the rate of the
addition to tax for fraud from fifty to seventy-five percent in 1986, it
cited as justification for the increase its concern that the additions at
their prior rate may have been an insufficient deterrent.28
Furthermore, even if a taxpayer files an amended return be-
fore any fraud investigation or proceeding has been commenced, pay-
ing all tax due, he must still pay the addition.281 Since the govern-
ment has not yet begun an investigation in this situation, the purpose
of such additions to tax for fraud cannot be to reimburse the govern-
ment for investigatory costs or losses. To the contrary, their role is to
prevent the filing of a fraudulent return in the first place. It is simply
beyond question that one, if not the sole, reason for imposing addi-
tions to tax for fraud is deterrence.
277. Id. at 1946.
278. Id.
279. See generally F. Phillip Mais, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 162(t): When Does
the Payment of Damages to a Government Punish the Payor?, 13 Va. Tax Rev. 271 (1993)
(concluding that courts must characterize IRS sanctions as punitive and treat them accord-
ingly).
280. Tax Reform Act of 1986, S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 180-82 (1986).
281. See Fedechko v. Commissioner, 60 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 272, 275 (1990) (holding
that the filing of amended returns and payment of all tax due did not vitiate the fraud




c. Conditioned on Commission of and Arrest for the Crime
Although the Montana drug tax's high rate and deterrent pur-
pose were important to the Supreme Court's holding in Kurth,282 the
Court placed greater emphasis on the fact that the tax was condi-
tioned upon the commission of a crime and was exacted only after the
taxpayer had been arrested for that same conduct constituting the
crime.283  As the Court noted, the only people who incurred liability
for this tax on possession were those who had already been arrested
for possession of illegal drugs.284
The addition to tax for fraud operates in a comparable manner.
The only people who incur liability for the addition to tax are those
taxpayers who have been investigated and proven, by some quantum
of evidence, to have acted with fraudulent intent to evade tax.28 5 This
is the same conduct that constitutes the crime of tax fraud, merely
sustained under a lesser burden of proof.286 The elements of criminal
tax fraud under section 7206 are identical to those elements for civil
tax fraud under section 6663.287 The only reason a civil tax fraud
conviction does not preclude the issue of fraud in a subsequent crim-
inal trial is that the civil proceeding imposes a lower burden of proof
and lacks the constitutional protections available in a criminal suit.28
The "unique features" of the drug tax in Kurth thus parallel
the features of the additions to tax for fraud. In Kurth, the Court
stressed that the taxpayer was only liable for the drug tax after being
arrested for criminal conduct relating to that assessment.28 9 In the
collection of additions to tax for fraud, the taxpayer is only liable for
the addition after she has been proven to have the necessary intent to
commit fraud290 by clear and convincing evidence. 291 If imposition of a
282. 114 S. Ct. at 1946-47.
283. Id. at 1947.
284. Id.
285. See I.R.C. §§ 6663, 7206-07. See also Musslewhite, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. at 643-646, 662
(cited in note 254) (discussing the common elements of civil and criminal tax fraud in the
context of collateral estoppel); Knight and Knight, 57 Mo. L. Rev. at 179-184 (cited in note 213)
(outlining the statutory provisions for fraud consequences).
286. Mosteller, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 761-63. For a discussion of this notion see
Part VA.1.
287. Fontneau, 654 F.2d at 10; Amos v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 358, 359 (4th Cir. 1965);
Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353, 355-58 (4th Cir. 1965); Musselwhite, 33 Am.. U. L. Rev. at
662 (cited in note 254).
288. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 397.
289. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
290. The requisite intent is the same under both the criminal and civil provisions. See
notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
291. This principle is discussed in detail in Part VA.1.
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consequence after there is probable cause to arrest a taxpayer for
possession of drugs is too closely tied to the crime of drug possession
to be considered a civil penalty, surely imposition of a consequence
after there has been proof by clear and convincing evidence of tax
fraud is equally, if not more, closely tied to the crime of tax fraud to be
considered a civil penalty.
Granted, a double jeopardy claim would not arise in either
situation unless an attempt was made to impose civil consequences
following the actual imposition of criminal consequences in a parallel
procedure. However, the Kurth Court did not base its analysis con-
cerning the character of the Montana tax on the fact that the tax was
collected after a criminal trial. Instead, it based its decision on the
fact that the tax became due after an arrest, thereby making the tax
inherently punitive.292 By allowing an arrest for criminal conduct
relating to the assessment of a civil consequence to be highly
indicative of a punitive, and therefore criminal, consequence, the
Supreme Court set a broad and potentially dangerous precedent. A
great number of civil penalties and forfeitures are imposed after an
individual has been arrested for the same conduct under a criminal
statute. Such penalties are now suspect under this aspect of the
Kurth decision.
To demonstrate, under Kurth's reasoning the additions to tax
for fraud would be too closely dependent upon the criminal conduct
constituting tax fraud to retain their civil character for double jeop-
ardy purposes anytime after the IRS and its agents collected enough
evidence upon which to base a valid arrest for tax fraud. Although
the IRS would be without authority to collect the addition to tax at
that point under section 6663,293 the possibility that the additions to
tax could lose their civil characterization at such an early stage of the
process raises several concerns. First, if the IRS could collect the
addition to tax at this early point in the process, and did so, a subse-
quent criminal action could be barred under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.294 Second, such an application of the Double Jeopardy Clause
constitutes a retreat from the Court's concern over a consequence's
effect on the individual, and a return to the structural and linguistic
292. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1947-48. See also Clifft, 641 N.E.2d at 691-93 (noting that the
Kurths were arrested in October, 1987, and that the tax was assessed in December, 1987, but
that the Kurths were not sanctioned pursuant to the criminal charges until July, 1988).
293. I.R.C. § 6663.
294. See Glickman, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1272 (cited in note 36).
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features of a consequence.2 95 While in this instance such a regression
results in greater protection for the individual by invalidating a sec-
ond consequence, it could later be used by courts as justification for
refusing to inquire into the true effect of a consequence on an individ-
ual. Third, fearing the invalidation of a civil consequence scheme due
to a successful double jeopardy challenge, legislatures may simply
raise the criminal fines, as suggested by the majority in Kurth.296
While avoiding a double jeopardy challenge, these increased fines may
still be unfair to the defendant and may become excessive, by lay-
person's and possibly by constitutional standards.
The strongest opposition to these arguments is the likelihood
that the holding of Kurth will be confined in later years to cases in-
volving actual taxes or even only state drug tax statutes, although the
majority made no such distinction in its reasoning. Nonetheless, the
potential for such undesirable consequiences exists after Kurth.297
2. The Dissents
The reasoning employed in the various Kurth dissents could
result in a conclusion contrary to that just demonstrated. Under
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, the additions to tax would not even be
examined under Kurth since they would be characterized as penal-
ties.2 95 Considering Justice Rehnquist's response to the majority's
misuse of Mitchell,299 he would probably find that Mitchell controlled
the case, and would presumably apply the Halper analysis of civil
penalties as the appropriate standard for the additions to tax for
fraud. Although predicting his answer would call for speculation,
Justice Rehnquist's question under Halper would certainly be
whether the additions to tax for fraud went beyond compensating the
government for its losses in bringing the fraudulent actor to book.300
Justice O'Connor would also apply Halper's reasoning to the
additions to tax, but for different reasons. Since Justice O'Connor
found no distinction between a fine and a tax in Kurth,30' she would
295. This is a regression to the statutory construction test under Mitchell and an abandon-
ment of the progress made in Halper concerning the inquiry into a consequence's actual effect
upon the individual. See Part 1I1-4-
296. 114 S. Ct. at 1947.
297. Note that the "unusual feature" of a possession tax on material no longer in the
taxpayer's possession is inapplicable in the area of taxpayer fraud. Id. at 1948.
298. Id. at 1949 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1949.
301. Id. at 1953 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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probably analyze a challenge to the addition to tax for fraud under
Halper, consistent with her analysis of the drug tax in her Kurth
dissent. As Justice O'Connor justified her conclusion that the
Montana tax was not punitive by stressing the immense financial
damages caused by drugs in our society,302 she could employ similar
reasoning to reach the same conclusion in a double jeopardy challenge
to the additions to tax for fraud by alluding to the billions of dollars
lost each year due to tax fraud.303
Justice Scalia would almost certainly uphold the additions to
tax. As Justice Scalia does not recognize a multiple punishments
protection in the Double Jeopardy Clause,304 his inquiry would consist
of whether the additions to tax were imposed in a civil or criminal
proceeding,305 and whether they were authorized by the legislature.306
This analysis would result in the finding that the legislature did in-
deed authorize the additions to tax in combination with the criminal
tax fraud consequences, and that the proceeding established by the
legislature was clearly civil.307 Therefore, the imposition of both con-
sequences in a parallel proceeding would not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Kurth set a precedent that could con-
ceivably place many civil and criminal parallel consequences in jeop-
ardy. Although it is arguably unfair for the Kurth family to have
been subjected to jail time, over $18,000 in civil forfeitures, and over
$900,000 in taxes, 308 the Court may have better dealt with that per-
ceived unfairness under another constitutional provision, as sug-
gested by Justice Scalia.39 As the decision stands, a civil consequence
imposed in conjunction with a criminal consequence could be subject
to scrutiny under the "unusual features" test. Many parallel
consequence regimes would probably fail this test. While the demise
302. Id. at 1953-54.
303. The federal government estimates its losses due to tax evasion and inaccurate report-
ing of taxable income at about $150 billion a year. Federal "Cheating" Losses Estimated, Facts
on File, World News Digest 973 E3 (December 31, 1993).
304. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1955-57 (Scalia J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1959-60.
306. Id. at 1956-57.
307. See notes 176-83, 221-38 and accompanying text.
308. Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1942.
309. Id. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of parallel proceedings may appear to protect individuals from being
subjected to large combinations of civil and criminal fines, it could
also have a number of negative repurcussions. For instance, the
decision could convince legislatures to increase criminal consequences
or could encourage law enforcement officials either to pursue those
heightened criminal sanctions more aggressively or simply to ensure
that the civil consequence is imposed simultaneously with or prior to
the criminal consequence.3 10 The Court could avoid the potentially
broad scope of Kurth by limiting its holding to cases involving state
drug taxes. The majority, however, placed no such limitation on its
holding. Consequently, its opinion could be used as a weapon with
which to invalidate many civil consequences, thus resulting in wide-
spread effects on legislation and law enforcement actions.
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